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The New Energy Order | Ravi Dharamshi at Transition VC's LP Mixer

ValueQuest published 2026-06-29 added 2026-06-30 score 8/10
energy transition india infrastructure capex investing grid ai
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ELI5/TLDR

Energy transition isn’t driven by altruism—it’s geopolitical necessity. Countries now need energy independence the way they once needed food security. This unlocks a 20-year global industrial capex super-cycle where the actual constraint isn’t capital or technology, but talent and execution speed. The winning investors won’t just bet on trends; they’ll find companies solving bottlenecks inside oligopolistic industries.

The Full Story

The Shift

For thirty years, the world ran on cost efficiency and just-in-time supply chains. That model broke in the last half-decade. COVID exposed supply chain fragility. Russia-Ukraine taught Europe it was entirely dependent on a rival for energy. Taiwan’s semiconductor chokepoint became obvious. And recent geopolitical shocks made energy independence a strategic asset, not a moral stance.

The drivers now are redundancy, resilience, and sovereignty. Countries can’t let rival nations weaponize leverage over critical supplies—semiconductors, defense, aerospace, energy. This doesn’t happen because executives suddenly care about climate. It happens because nations realize they need control.

The move toward energy independence is indiscretionary spend. It is inevitable, and it is a large spend that is playing out.

It’s Duplication, Not Transition

Here’s the subtlety everyone misses: we’re not replacing infrastructure. We’re duplicating it. You still need to grow fossil fuel capacity while transitioning to renewables because energy consumption itself is going up. Energy consumption will grow 2–3x faster than GDP in countries hitting 8–10% growth rates.

Why? Everything is plugged into energy. AI data centers are already 5% of US energy consumption and climbing to 10%. Every AI query is 10–20x more energy-intensive than a Google search. Manufacturing contribution to GDP needs to grow from 10–12% to 24–25%, and everything is energy-intensive. The entire value chain—semiconductors, defense, data centers, renewables—all feed into a single industrial capex super-cycle with energy as the through-line.

Solar Hasn’t Peaked

When a trend becomes consensus, people assume it’s played out. Not true. Solar will eventually be 50–70% of the energy basket. Right now it’s barely 10–11% of actual power generation (not installed capacity). The opportunity is far from saturated.

But the value within the solar value chain moves over time. Module manufacturing is commoditized—China owns that. The value has shifted to solar cells, and will eventually shift to wafers. Government policy deliberately uses cash-flow windows to push backward integration, so supply chains decouple from China. Perovskite and other emerging techs are still evolving. Rooftop solar, grid-scale solar, the equipment and services supporting them—all still real opportunities.

The Real Bottleneck: Grid

Solar works. AI works. The constraint is getting power from where it’s generated to where it’s consumed.

In the US, there’s no national grid. In India, there is—a rare advantage. But even then, hyperscalers are being told to build their own power plants because grid expansion can’t keep pace. They’re using gas turbines as interim solutions, not because it’s optimal, but because speed matters more than economics right now. It’s a land grab.

The real opportunities within the grid are specific: transformers, transmission lines, re-conductoring existing lines. And the talent to do it.

Where Value Gets Captured

Most investors stop at identifying a trend and buying whatever name gets mentioned. The skilled money finds companies solving bottlenecks inside oligopolistic structures.

Example: Solar is generated in far-off places (Kutch, Rajasthan, Leh-Ladakh) but consumed hundreds of kilometers away. Transmitting power over 500–700–1000 km with minimal losses requires HVDC or 765 kV technology. Only three companies have it: GE, Hitachi, Siemens. One of them owns 65–70% of the market. Inevitability of the opportunity plus oligopoly structure equals where maximum value gets captured.

The rule: either you own proprietary technology, or you’re part of an industry structure where not many players exist. That’s where the money goes.

India’s Constraint

Capital is not the issue. Government policy is supportive—you see it every day in how the policy stack evolves. Transition to semiconductors, supply chain resilience, this is all backed. India raised 723 crores for venture capital instead of the 300 crores targeted; capital would flow more if they kept the fund open. The problem isn’t regulation or economics. It’s talent and execution speed.

Any company that becomes a magnet for talent—because of the work itself, not just compensation—will win. Then they have to execute faster than competitors. Speed is always essential. Talent and execution. Those are the only two bottlenecks. India needs to overcapacitize energy infrastructure (1,500 GW instead of 500 GW) to become energy-surplus, not just net-zero. That requires massive execution on every front.

Key Takeaways

  • Energy transition is a 20-year global industrial capex super-cycle driven by geopolitics (sovereignty), not climate sentiment.
  • We’re duplicating infrastructure while transitioning, not replacing—energy demand grows 2–3x faster than GDP.
  • AI data centers alone consume 5% of US electricity and climbing; AI is fundamentally an energy infrastructure play.
  • Solar penetration (generation) is barely 10–11%; room to grow to 50–70% without saturation.
  • Grid connectivity is the actual constraint—not capital, not technology, but execution and scaling transmission.
  • Hyperscalers building their own power plants because grid can’t keep pace; land grab is happening now.
  • Oligopolistic industries capturing most value: HVDC/765 kV transmission (3 global players, one owns 65–70%).
  • Backward integration in solar supply chain (modules → cells → wafers) driven by government policy to decouple from China.
  • India’s advantages: national grid exists, government support strong, capital abundant. Disadvantages: talent scarcity and execution speed.
  • India should target 1,500 GW, not 500 GW, to become energy-surplus and power manufacturing growth.

Claude’s Take

This is a grounded, unsentimental read of energy transition. Dharamshi cuts through the climate-piety noise and treats it as what it is: an inevitable, large, geopolitically-driven capex cycle. The reframing matters. It’s not “should we go green?” (which is framing it as discretionary). It’s “given that every nation must decouple from rivals, what’s the only logical outcome?” That shifts from moral question to financial inevitability.

The grid bottleneck is the key insight. Everyone talks about solar and batteries. Fewer notice that the real constraint is getting power where it needs to be—and that’s an oligopoly play, not a commodity play. The HVDC example is tight: three global vendors, one owns 65–70% of the market, and this becomes indispensable infrastructure. That’s where huge value concentrates.

The talent observation is also honest. Capital and policy are solved problems in India. Talent scarcity and execution speed are real friction. That’s founder-focused and useful for evaluation.

One small note: Dharamshi frames this as a long-term megatrend but also a cycle (10–20 years). That’s worth remembering—you need to generate cash flows during the cycle window, diversify, and de-risk before it turns. It’s not “pick one solar stock and hold forever.” It’s “participate, cash out, build adjacent businesses, prepare for the cycle to close.”

Score: 8/10. Substantive, unsentimental, specific about bottlenecks and industry structure. Not groundbreaking, but the kind of talk that reshapes how you think about the category.

Further Reading

Dharamshi mentioned an article he wrote in Mint on “who really makes money in a mega trend”—worth finding if you want a written version of this framing.