Why India Wants German Submarines
read summary →Transcript: Why India wants German submarines
Channel: DW News
URL: https://youtu.be/8R6YDYJz0O8
You won’t see them. You won’t hear them. But submarines like this one could quietly shift the balance of power in a crucial global region. India is adding a new generation of submarines to its navy. It’s getting the design from Germany rather than its usual partner Russia. And it’s building them itself. That is important. Expectations definitely are high. This is a deal that has long been in the making. The reported 8 billion dollar deal says a lot about India’s drive for self reliance. And about regional rivalries fueling a new arms race. Firstly, India does face a very challenging threat environment. But why does India want these submarines– and why is it building them itself? Why is Germany willing to share critical tech with India? And how much of this is really about China? Or Russia? These are the questions we’re going to dive into with this video. India is a nuclear armed military power. And so are its two neighbors and rivals: China and Pakistan. All three are spending heavily on submarines, warships, and marine bases. They all see naval strength as vital to project power abroad and deter rivals including each other. India’s coastline, more than 11,000 kilometers of it, has shaped its history, defense and trade. But India is vulnerable to several choke points. Narrow passages where traffic is easy to disrupt. Threats to these sea lanes put India’s entire economy at risk. More than 90% of India’s trade moves by sea. And this is why it’s so important for India to maintain freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region to lessen disruptions to trade, which is why India wants to enhance its naval power. The place to be is under the water. That’s where you can monitor enemy ships without being seen, protect sea lanes and deter nominally stronger navies. Submarines are actually evolving into probably one of the most crucial capabilities in terms of maritime power in the Indo-Pacific. And part of the reason for that is that the surface is increasingly becoming a very heavily contested and even denied space. The subs involved in this deal are diesel electric Type 214s. They are smaller, quieter and cheaper than nuclear powered subs. And they have a key feature: AIP Air‑Independent Propulsion. Well, essentially what AIP allows a submarine to do is remain submerged for longer periods without a requirement to do what traditional conventional submarines would have had to have to do. It’s a key upgrade for India. They can stay under water for weeks. Almost like nuclear powered subs but at a fraction of the price. It gives it some of the characteristics of a of a nuclear submarine, while at the same time retaining the advantages of a conventionally powered system. The Germans are global leaders in Air Independent Propulsion. They call it ‘Aussenluftunabhängige Antriebsanlage’. Long word, big advantage. This is where the Type 214 submarines involved in this deal are designed. Kiel, northern Germany, home to TKMS. Why Germany is sending this tech to India is a question we’ll return to. The subs work like this: They use fuel cells to combine hydrogen and oxygen, generating electricity to propel the sub. It’s quiet– which is good for going undetected. The system generates no exhaust, and doesn’t need to surface for air. The waters around India are often shallow. The lighter the blue on this map, the more shallow the water. AIP subs are well suited for this– their smaller size means they can operate close to shore where the bigger nuclear subs struggle. And in the crowded seas and tight passages their quietness is also an advantage. The benefits were on full display in a US led war game back in 2005. A small Swedish AIP submarine slipped through heavy defenses. It scored a simulated kill on a multi billion dollar aircraft carrier. Twice. The success of the Swedish boat, I think, did illustrate one of the core advantages of conventionally powered submarines, which is they can loiter in a at relatively slow speeds, in a in an area at very low acoustic signature and produce what you might describe as a pop up threat, a sort of a threat that emerges almost out of nowhere for an aircraft carrier. In a sense, they’re a sort of an ambush tool, you might say. Smart stealth, beating size, power and big budgets. With China just next door, that would be useful for India. For the moment, India has quite a small submarine fleet, most of which comes from Soviet times. So these are also quite old. So what India is really looking for is to modernize these naval capabilities. And it’s splashing the cash to do so, outspending rival Pakistan. But still not coming anywhere near China. China now has the biggest navy in the world, massively out manning and out gunning its oceanic neighbors India and Pakistan. And that’s not all about Taiwan. It’s not even all about China. We’ve seen China’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which is an increasingly contested theater, but also Pakistan’s expanding naval capabilities. And here you see China and Pakistan working together. Pakistan’s president Asif Ali Zardari and his navy chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf shopping in China for a new submarine. They bought eight advanced subs for around five billion dollars– one of the biggest arms export deals in Chinese history. The first should enter service this year. Chinese shipyards have built four of them. But Pakistan is building the other four, using Chinese technology. So this is more than shipbuilding, to some degree it’s a technology‑sharing deal too. The key to these subs- they have similar AIP capability that India is getting in its German deal. And it’s not just subs– Pakistan buys about 80 percent of its weapons from China. This deepening military relationship has strengthened China’s role in Pakistan’s armed forces. Relations between India and Pakistan are tense. In May 2025, the rumbling conflict between the countries turned hot. They fought each other for four days and there was significant fear of a wider war. Meanwhile, Indian and Chinese soldiers have clashed along their disputed border high up in the Himalayas. All of this makes the Indian Ocean more crowded, more militarized and more on edge. But China and Pakistan are not the only players shaping India’s choices at sea. When India shows off its military might, most of the weapons you’ll see are made in Russia. The older kit comes from the Soviet Union. That was India’s main source of arms every decade since the 1960s. But there’s a shift, and France, Israel and the United States are increasingly important partners. One example: India plans to buy 114 French fighter aircraft another multibillion dollar deal. The German government has made it clear it wants part of that business, and the influence that comes with it. This deal, the submarines to India, that is commercially important for Germany. But geopolitics is clearly the frame, right. It also means that India has alternatives to Russian goods, because let’s not forget that it is in Germany’s very own interest that Russia is isolated for as long as the Kremlin is waging war against a sovereign neighboring country. So is this German deal India breaking away from Russia? Or is it a question of diversification? Hedging rather than completely replace Russian imports. Because these will, of course remain important for India, given that Russian platforms are a lot more affordable. There are also less conditions attached when it comes to things like technology transfer. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is maintaining his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. And it’s not just smiles and handshakes- there’s also these: Talwar‑class frigates- advanced warships built by Russia for the Indian Navy. They’ve got eight already, with two more under construction in Indian shipyards. So India is buying naval power from its old partner Russia And from western nations. It’s hedging its bets. But these deals are also two pronged on production. They include tech transfer so India will be able to make its own high end boats and subs. So why is Germany willing to do this? It’s not just the money although there’s a lot involved. The Type 214s will not be built at the TKMS shipyard in Germany. They’ll be built at this shipyard in Mumbai. By Indian engineers trained by AIP specialists from TKMS in Germany. It’s easy enough to see why India would want to do this: The goal for India is eventually, you know, that they would enable India to develop its domestic expertise to construct submarines and foster the growth of the local defense industry, while, of course, also reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. Submarine technology has typically remained quite a closely guarded domain. But why would Germany want to share such closely guarded expertise? Technology transfer always creates interdependence, right? So industrial, political, strategic. And so Berlin believes that India has the institutional capacity and that it has the safeguards in place that they can handle sensitive technology responsibly. And so from Berlin’s point of view this kind of cooperation does strengthen trust and does make the relationship harder to reverse. And that is exactly the point. I think Berlin also wants to wean New Delhi away from Moscow. Among major weapons producers, Germany has long maintained some of the world’s strictest arms export laws. But the strategic context has changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, there’s now greater acceptance here in Berlin that security partnerships, especially when you look at democratic or strategically aligned states, and that includes India, that that may require defense cooperation, including arms exports, if Germany wants to be taken seriously as a security actor. That foreign policy shift includes Germany’s attitude to the Indo Pacific, which it calls a key security region. And the Chinese navy. Beijing’s aggressive posturing has raised concerns, and Germany has been trying to cement its security footprint in the Indo-Pacific. And I think partnering with India is one way to do so. So supporting India’s naval capabilities does align with Germany’s broader interests in freedom of navigation, secure sea lanes and a rules based order. And Germany seems to think that India is now its most natural partner in the region on many fronts. India is increasingly viewed here in Berlin as a stabilizing force in the Indo-Pacific and a partner with whom Germany shares concerns about regional security and about China’s growing influence. And Pakistan, by contrast, is seen as being embedded in a very different security architecture with close military ties to China. German-Indian cooperation is anchored in a so called Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap, agreed by both countries earlier this year. It could work both ways. Combining German technology with India’s manufacturing capabilities and ability to scale that could contribute to Germany’s military build-up. And there are already some concrete examples of this. For instance, the German company Rheinmetall, it’s partnered with India’s Reliance Defence company to manufacture artillery shells in India. Germany has already sold Type‑214 subs to several other partners, including Greece, Turkey, South Korea, and Portugal. But Shairee Malhotra says the India deal is special. This would be the first time that Germany will be transferring this technology to a non-European country. How complete that technology transfer will be is not yet clear. South Korea has already built the same German submarines under license, but we don’t know whether India will end up making more of the components itself. The details of this will matter a lot in terms of which technology is being transferred and which capabilities will come directly from Germany, because on the one hand, there will be a desire both from the standpoint of a retention of IP and also certain security considerations to maintain the most sensitive components of the submarine within the German supply chain. And on the other hand, I suspect there will be a desire on the Indian side to try to eventually build up to making as much as possible of the submarine in India. Because that has become the key. Navies don’t just want to buy AIP anymore, they want to be able to build it themselves. For India, this deal promises deterrence, jobs, and greater self‑reliance, as it seeks to secure its maritime backyard in a growing race for regional sea power. For Germany, it offers a commercial foothold in a major economy and a deeper role in Indo‑Pacific security. From Berlin’s perspective, this is about strategic trust and long-term alignment. Weapons deals, they do bind you to another country for quite some time. But it’s not that simple. India is non aligned. It’s a key component of its foreign policy. Germany may be over‑estimating how much influence it can gain. The submarine deal will not suddenly turn New Delhi into a German or European ally even if it does open a commercial pathway. These are the kind of arrangements that India prefers: more flexible arrangements rather than, you know, legally binding arrangements, flexible arrangements that can also be reviewed and altered based on circumstances as time passes by. The Type 214 submarines may strengthen India’s position at sea. But like any arms race, the growing quest for naval power in the Indian Ocean carries risks. More submarines mean more patrols, closer encounters, and a higher chance of miscalculation. And once countries lock themselves into long‑term military competition, stepping back becomes much harder.