China Is Putting Building Blocks For A New Global Order Vijay Gokhale

China looked at the world right from before the revolution of 1949. I don’t think they’re thinking a multipolar Asian order there. There China wants to be the deciding pole. I think it’s an alliance of convenience. I think they are standing with their backs against each other. On the one side, China has very good relationship with Iran and China might also like to see the United States getting stuck uh in the Persian Gulf region. Hello and welcome to the Hindu. This is Stanley Johnny the Hindu foreign affairs editor. I’m today joined by Mr. Vijay Gawklay India’s former foreign secretary whose latest book China’s war the politics and diplomacy behind its military coercion has recently been released and Anad Krishna my colleague from the Hindu. Thanks for joining us Mr. Koklay.

Thank you very much. Thanks very much for being here. So your new book looks at China’s wars and how China deploys coercion. So from an Indian point of view, when we look at both 1962 and our history with China and something more alive, which is the current situation along the line of actual control, why is it important for us to understand how China acts and Chinese behavior? Well, first and foremost, Anand, it’s a neighbor with which we have a troubled relationship and an unsettled boundary which stretches over thousands of kilometers. uh for another that boundary despite the best efforts that the Indian governments have made over this last 60 o years is still not settled because in my opinion uh China has perhaps not decided that the boundary needs to be settled. In other words, we are going to have to deal with the situation of uncertainty on the border certainly for the foreseeable future. And therefore I felt it important to write this book mainly to accumulate knowledge on how China looks at the conflict both historically and that which it is undertaking at present in terms of what I call grreyzone coions to see if there are any patterns that can be discerned about how China may act or do we get any advanced warning of how they may act in the leadup to the next crisis. Uh I’m quite clear about one thing Anant and that is that it suits China to maintain uncertainty and a certain level of tension on the India China line of actual control because it is in a sense a way that they can keep us uh controlled and they can tighten or loosen the the tension uh without necessarily a very heavy expenditure and without risking the escalation of conflict. So an unsettled LAC is something that for them suits them. I think at this stage yes it does. And one of the things that for me was a big takeaway from your book is uh we tend to look at the relationship with China as an India China relationship driven by what both countries are bilaterally looking at. But one thing that seems to be a common thread through all the conflicts look at it’s not just on India but you look at the second Taiwan state crisis and other conflicts South China Sea often China’s actions are not just about the country they’re dealing with but about their global kind of interests and the external situation of earth right so you know when I uh started doing research on China’s India policy because most often people in India write about India’s China policy but I decided to Look at the other way. I was really surprised at how China looked at the world right from before the revolution of 1949. So if you read Maetung’s writings during the second world war and immediately after the second world war, he talks of China as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific with the right to decide what the new Asian order will look like. And uh he always spoke in the context of China’s relations with two other major powers, the United States and the URSTW Soviet Union which is now the Russian Federation and always looked at international affairs within this triangular balance of power. It is important for us to understand this because despite some changes, this continues to be the matrix on the basis of which China runs foreign policy even today. The only difference being the Russian Federation has replaced the Soviet Union and in the hierarchy of power, China is now bigger or more powerful than Russia whereas the Soviet Union was much more powerful than China. But if you keep these two differences aside, they still judge every other relationship and that includes the India China relationship in the context of this triangular balance of power. And therefore one of the points I have made is if you simply look at India China relations in a bilateral context uh it won’t work because they are not looking at it bilaterally. They are looking at it uh not only in terms of relations with India but India’s relations with the United States with the Russian Federation and possibly with any other player which might be involved in a particular situation that could be the European Union it could be Japan it could be a quad partner and so on. In the book you have written about Taiwan’s trade crisis. You have written about both external factors and the internal factors that influenced the Chinese decision-m and when when we talk about the external factors that involves the developments in West Asia. But now when you look at China, China is seen as a peer power to the United States. So there is a larger geopolitical contest between the United States and China. The so-called G2 if I borrow it from President Donald Trump. uh so uh and there is also a lot of debate about the breakdown in the international order. So from a Chinese perspective, what kind of a world order that China wants to see? So that’s a very interesting question Stanley. I think we have to begin by understanding that China is perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the postcond world war order particularly the economic and trade parts of it because it is really China’s entry into the WTO even as a non-market economy which helped China build its GDP from 1 or 2 trillion to the current 20 trillion. But it is also clear that where it has suited China to deviate from UN principles or from multilateral principles to secure their own interest, they have chosen to do so. That includes both in terms of peace and security because after all China is doing things in the South China Sea which are against the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as judgments that have been delivered and that is true on the economic side because China continues to be a non-market economy which does not give reciprocal market access even today on for one reason or another including to India and to Indian products. So I think at this stage China is ambivalent about the international order. It is a beneficiary but it is not willing to spend blood or treasure to uphold that when the United States which is the creator and defender of that global order is beginning to have doubts. Now does it want the international order as it exists currently to collapse? That’s still a question mark to my mind because I don’t think they have any clear idea of what will be the alternative. But I can clearly see them putting the building blocks in place. The belt and road initiative, the global security, cultural and developmental initiatives, now the global security initiative, this so-called fuzzy notion of the community for the shared future of mankind. This concept that we are all together in it because our interests are convergent. All these in a sense give some indication of the global order that China would like to see. One thing is clear that new global order has to either accommodate China as one of the two most powerful countries on par with the United States or perhaps the most powerful country. So I think it’s still a concept in the making. They are waiting to see to what extent the disintegration uh happens and how quickly it happens given that President Trump is still in office for 2 years uh and then on that basis start marshalling countries from the global south as well as other like-minded countries but it’s too early to say whether they want to see it collapse or not. A follow up to Stanley’s question. The last 10, 15, 20 years, India and China have often spoken about having convergences on how they look at the world order changing that they want more multipolarity etc. Um, but do you actually see meaningful overlaps or convergences in how we look at it and how China looks at it or are we speaking of different things when we speak of multipolarity for example? Well uh first of all I think we need to be clear in the subreional and regional contexts that is South Asia and the Indo-Pacific I think we are very much either on a collision course or into very long-term competition. Uh but at a global level the fact is that we are both eating into the share of the western pie. uh to the extent that we grow and we become bigger or more prosperous there is a zero sum game happening at the other end and we’re seeing it playing out I think there there are areas where we can collaborate including on climate change energy security food security uh uh se security of the sea lanes of communication and so on which are important to us but also in order to balance the overwhelming western dominance of international and multilateral institutions. uh however of course as you come nearer to home there is a competitive situation so I think they would like to see a more multi-olar world in the sense of other countries which are big enough to withstand pressure from the United States uh although China doesn’t really think that aside from the US and China there will be a third pole as such but if you come to the Indo-Pacific region I don’t think they’re thinking a multipolar Asian order there where China wants to be the deciding poll and they don’t want any competition. So it’s a sort of mixed bag. At a global level they would prefer a more multipolar world. At a regional level I don’t think that is something that they see is as in their interest. Uh so one takeaway uh is that China doesn’t see any other poll besides the United States and China from what you just pointed out which takes me to the Russia question. uh because uh you know uh Russia is uh it is now it’s now facing a lot of backlash over the Ukraine war and the war is continuing and Russia has also substantially improved its relationship with China and there are a lot of concerns about the growing Russen Russian relationship in in India the foreign minister himself had said that Russia should be provided multiple options and then there are concerns about Russia being driven into the Chinese hands how do you look at this relationship between Russia and China and from an Indian point of view. Yeah. So I think look there’s no doubt that uh China and Russia have come close to each other but there are alliances and there are alliances in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom for for instance there is an almost perfect uh synergy both in interests and values language culture history religion economy polity uh all of them match. In the case of China and the Soviet Union, that is not the case. Uh there there are cultural differences. One is Russian Orthodox and the other doesn’t believe in religion. Uh there are concerns over the territorial uh acquisitions which the Chinese uh which the Russians made from the Chinese in the 19th century. Language is not the same. The Russians are more European and the Chinese more Asian. I think it’s an alliance of convenience. I think they are standing with their backs against each other from a possible frontal attack from a common existential threat. Now, of course, does that mean we should not we should be sanguin? I don’t think we should be. But until there is clear evidence that the Russians are providing China with material or information which is hazardous to India’s national security, I think it would be premature to jump to a conclusion. The fact is that at the moment at least I don’t think in any sense Russia has compromised India’s security for the benefit of of China. They need the Chinese frankly it’s the biggest market when the west is close to them. It is the largest consumer of their energy when the west is close to them. uh and therefore uh to a certain extent it hides the the problems in the relationship which includes concerns over the Chinese reoccupying the northeast, the Chinese trying to uh become an Arctic power which Russia sees as its own baywick. Uh and there are a number of other issues including the depressed prices at which China is acquiring oil and gas. We should keep the relationship under close observation. Of course uh we should be concerned if important military technologies are being transferred because it may not be the China uses it against us but we know who China transfers those technologies to Pakistan Pakistan and and others for that matter. uh and therefore we should certainly be tracking that. But I think to come to the decision that the relationship between Russia and China is harmful to India will require a good deal of facts because the reality is uh Russia is not only the only country which has consistently stood with us in our times of crisis but it is to my mind the only country which has actually transferred some technology in key areas to us. uh whereas in the other cases it’s just a buyer seller relationship. So uh another major crisis we are facing is in West Asia which is also you know India is being affected by this war. Uh one quick question is I’m I myself am trying to understand the Chinese position because on the one side China has very good relationship with Iran and China might also like to see the United States getting stuck uh in the Persian Gulf region but the closure of the state of Hormos and the economic consequences of the war is a major challenge for the Chinese as well. How do you understand these contradictions? So I think firstly the general view that merely because China is not saying and doing anything it does not have the capacity to influence the situation is wrong. China is very studied in the way that it acts and at this stage its interests are being taken care of by other countries including Pakistan and therefore there is no immediate compulsion to act. Never. Nevertheless, I think the longer the crisis drags on, the more it’s going to hurt the Chinese economy. And the Chinese are well aware of it. Of course, they have a larger strategic reserve than we have, so they can hold out much longer. On the other hand, I think if you look at it, China’s core interests in the Gulf are of course first and foremost energy and that they will secure. But beyond that uh if you look at the fact that the Chinese navy is poised to enter the Indian Ocean before the end of this decade then you have to presume that the China Iran relationship and China’s relationship with perhaps some other countries including Oman for instance or even Saudi Arabia is being looked at from a strategic perspective. From that perspective, so long as Iran remains intact, and by intact I mean the current regime is in place, it gives China subsequent leverage on multiple fronts. Number one, when these billions of dollars are released by other countries and Iran rebuilds, who is going to get the contracts? It is going to be Chinese companies. Uh number two, when chi Iran rebuilds its military, because that is going to happen whether the West likes it or not, who is going to be able to sell them arms? It’s not going to be the Europeans. There will be an embargo there. So, it’s going to be China again. Thirdly, China has potential ports for its Indian Ocean strategy in the in the in near future. Uh uh ports like Jusk or even Chabahar which can be used and a reliable uh country there. So, I think we have to look at all these aspects. I did of course think there was one area where Iran would also learn a lesson from what happened and that is uh because here also there is a strait and the problem they have is also a straight is the Taiwan strait and that is that however technologically you advanced you are a weaker country can hold you at bay and you will have to spend a lot of blood and treasure to occupy it. So bombing Taiwan will be different from taking physical possession of the island. And I think this war would have given them pause to restrategize or rethink that overwhelming military superiority. It can can result in a blockade, a quarantine, but it can’t force the island to submit. So I think China has lessons to be learned, but they also are looking at the benefits of the situation. And there are there is a silver lining. uh their only hope is that the situation doesn’t prolong to a point where the energy crisis becomes a problem. China US competition is obviously the backdrop to many of these things that we’ve been speaking about and including the situation in Taiwan as well is going to be impacted by that. What did you make of uh Trump’s visit to Beijing as well as it was it was not very surprising to hear President Xi speak of the need for a relationship of constructive strategic stability. It was surprising to see the US also use that term. Uh so what did you make of this effort by both sides and how should we in India be looking at what’s been happening with this effort to stabilize? So firstly I think it was this visit was basically to put a floor on what was a rapidly falling relationship. I think the objective is that by the time President Xi travels to Washington in September or October, they would have got six months in which to actually find tangible deliverables. So I think that was really the objective. But this convergence on the phrase a constructive relationship of strategic stability suggests to me that there would be a shift in the US position from outright containment of China to accommodation through competition. That’s the best way I can put it. In other words, they have to fiercely compete. But the competition is not done in a way which involves a lot of uh resources to try and contain them but to somehow uh manage them or accommodate them. Now, of course, this has uh undoubtedly has potential implications for us. Firstly, does it mean that uh the salience of India in the American strategic calculus and of South Asia in general has declined? And if that is the case, does it mean that the Americans will be more tolerant of a greater Chinese role in the region? Because that directly impacts on our relationship with all our neighbors. So I think we have to be mindful of that. I’m saying this because in 1996 when we had a nuclear test, sorry, 1997, uh they went to Beijing and signed an agreement, a joint statement, the president of China and President Clinton which said that China had a role in South Asia. So that is uh the first concern I think we need to think about. The second concern is where does quad go from here. It is very clear to me that uh the US strategy of dealing with China has shifted from the Indo-Pacific to the Pacific and there Japan and Australia have a common interest with China but India does not necessarily have an aligned interest. We are broadly concerned with affairs west of the Malaga Strait. If this ocean the Indian Ocean is of less significance to the Americans then uh the it it brings the question of how committed uh the other three will be to India’s concerns and interests in Quad. So we have to consider that. The third of course is uh and Sandy referred to it this G2. Now it doesn’t have to be formally stated. No country is actually going to formally state it. But if a G2 takes shape the real concern is not geopolitical for India. It’s technological. You know the thing is uh we are in the process of just setting up the rules for all the new technologies in the world. All the current rules are for 20th century technologies. Nuclear, missiles, biological, chemical, trade. Uh these are all 20th century technologies. civil aviation for that maritime uh the new technologies cyber outer space underwater AI blockchain quantum there are no rules these two are by far ahead of anybody else in the game if as a G2 they decide that they will set the rules it will have massive implications for us because presumably by the middle of this century we will be the largest consuming nation in the world and if we are not at the rule table and the two of them decide rules Perhaps in perpetuity we are disadvantaged or certainly for many decades we will be disadvantaged and I think that should be a matter of concern to us. So I think what we need to follow on the G2 debate is not the international geopolitics of it but the the the the techn the geotechnology part of it. I think that is crucial. I think the Canadian prime minister said if you’re not at the table you’re on the menu. Yes. So that’s something to worry about. Yeah. But we should worry about it from the technology aspect not the the the traditional geo strategic or geopolitical aspect. If I can also just ask on India and China and the other sort of point you make in the book is we tend to think of coercion as a as a military uh domain activity but uh you also make the point that there are multiple levers and there multiple planes on which this plays out. There’s economic side increasingly there’s a technology side. So when we look at the relationship with China and our vulnerabilities, uh what’s your sense of how we look at it maybe in a more kind of macro perspective across different domains in a way that maybe we aren’t looking at at the moment? I think we are looking at all the domains, but I’m not sure we’re looking at it holistically. On the security side, I have no doubt that because of the incidents which have transpired on the LC over the last decade, government has ramped up its capability to a substantial degree both in terms of the number of forces along the in the border area but also equipment and infrastructure as well and we are seeing this the the latest being the Zujila tunnel which through which they’ve just managed to find a passageway. uh on the economic side less so uh because the fact of the matter is the trade figures themselves show you that we continue to import more and more from China including of electronics which is now apparently as big an import uh uh expenditure as energy is. uh whereas in many of these cases those are components which are legacy components or legacy uh platforms which can very well be made in India and to the extent you are dependent on Chinese supply chains they have a an increasing choke hold on you have exercised it lately in a somewhat milder fashion denying you some equipment tunnel boring equipment or calling the technicians from Apple back uh or uh such like they haven’t really exercised ized it in the way they have done with uh the Philippines or with Japan u black or with Korea blacklisting uh uh uh supermarket chains or or completely stopping the import of Philippines fruits and so on. You have to ask yourself the question why they haven’t done that and I suspect that they don’t want to endanger what is going to be the world’s potentially largest market in another 15 to 20 years. But we should never assume that they will not exercise these levers and they have substantial economic levers they can exercise. So I think that really the focus needs to be on the economic and technology dependencies because on the national security side I think we are already not only focused but we are actually acting. So one last question you refer to China as an opportunistic power. Can you explain what it is? This is you are using it only for China or countries in general are opportunistic. All countries are opportunistic. I think we have to accept that. But I used it in the particular context of this uh triangular balance of power. Wherever the Chinese have felt that the other two major powers are either distracted or uh in conflict with each other or in some way um involved with other developments, China finds it an opportune moment to secure its own interest globally. uh and therefore uh I make it in the context of if there is a conflict or tension with India it will be looked at on how it benefits China in that global triangular balance of power not just in the in in India China bilateral relations that’s the context I made it in soj author of China’s war was fascinating conversation thank you so much for joining us thank end